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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
164views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
105views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
13 years 10 months ago
Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling
For the problem of online real-time scheduling of jobs on a single processor, previous work presents matching upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be achieved ...
Ryan Porter