34 search results - page 2 / 7 » An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mecha... |
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
MFCS
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2002
Springer
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de...
ESA
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that the "players" cannot improve their utilities by "chea...
IOR
2010
13 years 3 months ago
2010
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism desig...