44 search results - page 8 / 9 » An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination ... |
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We study the complexity issues for Walrasian equilibrium in a special case of combinatorial auction, called single-minded auction, in which every participant is interested in only ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 5 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
2004
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
FCT
2007
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2007
Springer
We investigate issues regarding two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Chris...