We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form o...
Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska...
In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
This paper reports empirical results from a study into the use of 2D widgets in 3D immersive virtual environments. Several researchers have proposed the use of 2D interaction tech...