17 search results - page 1 / 4 » An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transfera... |
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
CATS
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2010
Springer
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...