We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-call...
We present a formal model for modeling and reasoning about security protocols. Our model extends standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic approaches with a formalization of phys...
Patrick Schaller, Benedikt Schmidt, David A. Basin...
Ping-pong protocols with recursive definitions of agents, but without any active intruder, are a Turing powerful model. We show that under the environment sensitive semantics (i.e....
In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and ...
Given an arbitrary intruder deduction capability, modeled as an inference system S and a protocol, we show how to compute an inference system bS such that the security problem for ...