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ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Dorota Marciniak...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a c...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Dorota Marciniak, Marcin Szamo...
AI
2010
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
On the measure of conflicts: Shapley Inconsistency Values
There are relatively few proposals for inconsistency measures for propositional belief bases. However inconsistency measures are potentially as important as information measures f...
Anthony Hunter, Sébastien Konieczny
ECTEL
2009
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
The Influence of Coalition Formation on Idea Selection in Dispersed Teams: A Game Theoretic Approach
In an open innovation environment, organizational learning takes place by means of dispersed teams which expand their knowledge through collaborative idea generation. Research is o...
Rory L. L. Sie, Marlies Bitter-Rijpkema, Peter B. ...