In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather t...
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Curtis M...
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...
We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form o...
Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska...