We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are combinatorial auctions in which the auctioneer and the bidders negotiate over transformations rather than over simple goods. By proposi...
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
Combinatorial auctions are important as they enable bidders to place bids on combinations of items; compared to other auction mechanisms, they often increase the efficiency of the...
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...