9 search results - page 2 / 2 » Auction design with costly preference elicitation |
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2004
Springer
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...