The aim of this research is to develop an adaptive agent based model of auction scenarios commonly used in auction theory to help understand how competitors in auctions reach equil...
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, for agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. In a bidding club agents first conduct a “pre-auction” within th...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mecha...
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...