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» Auctions with Arbitrary Deals
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AE
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
An Agent Model for First Price and Second Price Private Value Auctions
The aim of this research is to develop an adaptive agent based model of auction scenarios commonly used in auction theory to help understand how competitors in auctions reach equil...
Anthony J. Bagnall, Iain Toft
FOCS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar
SIGECOM
2000
ACM
142views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2000»
13 years 9 months ago
Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions
We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, for agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. In a bidding club agents first conduct a “pre-auction” within th...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
AAMAS
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
On the Natural Selection of Market Choice
An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mecha...
Aviv Bergman, Moshe Tennenholtz
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen