Abstract. We consider finding maximin strategies and equilibria of explicitly given extensive form games with imperfect information but with no moves of chance. We show that a max...
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, T...
Abstract. We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players...
We develop an algorithm for opponent modeling in large extensive-form games of imperfect information. It works by observing the opponent’s action frequencies and building an opp...
Abstract. This paper demonstrates the use of pattern-weights in order to develop a strategy for an automated player of a non-cooperative version of the game of Diplomacy. Diplomacy...
Perfect recall is the common and natural assumption that an agent never forgets. As a consequence, the agent can always condition its choice of action on any prior observations. I...
Kevin Waugh, Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, M...