11 search results - page 1 / 3 » Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities |
AAAI
2007
13 years 7 months ago
2007
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
Abstract. Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting...
EC
2006
13 years 4 months ago
2006
Learning Classifier Systems (LCSs), such as the accuracy-based XCS, evolve distributed problem solutions represented by a population of rules. During evolution, features are speci...
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2006
ACM
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
RECSYS
2010
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2010
ACM
We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a new geotagging service, Gloe, that makes it easy to find, rate and recommend arbitrary on-line content in a mobile settin...