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» Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
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IPTPS
2003
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks
Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user’s ability to modify ...
Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Robust Incentive-Compatible Feedback Payments
Abstract. Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
13 years 10 months ago
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
CLUSTER
2002
IEEE
13 years 9 months ago
Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Load Balancing in Distributed Systems
Computational Grids are large scale computing system composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. T...
Daniel Grosu, Anthony T. Chronopoulos
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 9 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm