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» Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
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IPTPS
2003
Springer
9 years 3 months ago
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks
Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user’s ability to modify ...
Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
ATAL
2006
Springer
9 years 2 months ago
Robust Incentive-Compatible Feedback Payments
Abstract. Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
9 years 4 months ago
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
CLUSTER
2002
IEEE
9 years 3 months ago
Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Load Balancing in Distributed Systems
Computational Grids are large scale computing system composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. T...
Daniel Grosu, Anthony T. Chronopoulos
AAAI
2015
3 years 6 months ago
Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design
In a classic result in the mechanism design literature, Cremer and McLean (1985) show that if buyers’ valuations are sufficiently correlated, a mechanism exists that allows the...
Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo
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