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» Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
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PODC
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen
AAAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Partial Revelation Automated Mechanism Design
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
13 years 10 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CP
2003
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game (aka. mechanism) so that a desirable outcome (according to a given objective) is reached despite the fact that each a...
Tuomas Sandholm