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» Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
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ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
AAAI
2007
13 years 7 months ago
Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tu...
AIIDE
2008
13 years 7 months ago
Recombinable Game Mechanics for Automated Design Support
Systems that provide automated game-design support-whether fully automated game generators, or tools to assist human designers--must be able to maintain a representation of a game...
Mark J. Nelson, Michael Mateas
AAAI
2007
13 years 7 months ago
Logic for Automated Mechanism Design - A Progress Report
Over the past half decade, we have been exploring the use of logic in the specification and analysis of computational economic mechanisms. We believe that this approach has the p...
Michael Wooldridge, Thomas Ågotnes, Paul E. ...