Recent work has applied game-theoretic models to real-world security problems at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS). The analysis o...
Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe, Janusz Mare...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
Predictable allocations of security resources such as police officers, canine units, or checkpoints are vulnerable to exploitation by attackers. Recent work has applied game-theo...
Christopher Kiekintveld, Manish Jain, Jason Tsai, ...
The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for o...
Manish Jain, Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe
In creating an evacuation simulation for training and planning, realistic agents that reproduce known phenomenon are required. Evacuation simulation in the airport domain requires...
Jason Tsai, Natalie Fridman, Emma Bowring, Matthew...