3 search results - page 1 / 1 » Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2005
IEEE
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ...
ISAAC
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2005
ACM
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...