8 search results - page 2 / 2 » Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions |
CIMCA
2008
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2008
IEEE
Online auctions have become extremely popular in recent years. Ability to predict winning bid prices accurately can help bidders to maximize their profit. This paper proposes a nu...
RIDE
2002
IEEE
13 years 9 months ago
2002
IEEE
This paper addresses the issue of developing agents capable of participating in several potentially simultaneous auctions of different kinds (English, First-Price, Vickrey), with ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...