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AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2000
ACM
119views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2000»
13 years 9 months ago
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen
SODA
2010
ACM
201views Algorithms» more  SODA 2010»
14 years 2 months ago
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
WINE
2009
Springer
117views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
13 years 12 months ago
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envy-free way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain th...
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek
ICALP
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Real-Time Scheduling with a Budget
We are given a set of jobs each has a processing time, a non-negative weight, a set of possible time intervals in which it can be processed and a cost. The goal is to schedule a f...
Joseph Naor, Hadas Shachnai, Tami Tamir