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» Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions
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15 years 3 months ago
An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
Sujit Guajr, Y Narahari
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction
In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer...
Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
AAAI
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm