37 search results - page 6 / 8 » Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions |
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
JAIR
2006
13 years 5 months ago
2006
Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute acti...
WSC
2008
13 years 8 months ago
2008
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...
IJCAI
2001
13 years 7 months ago
2001
Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...