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ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
HICSS
2007
IEEE
141views Biometrics» more  HICSS 2007»
14 years 3 days ago
Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
Dirk Neumann, Björn Schnizler, Ilka Weber, Ch...
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
144views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Security model for a multi-agent marketplace
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...
Ashutosh Jaiswal, Yongdae Kim, Maria L. Gini
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 5 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan