4 search results - page 1 / 1 » Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanism... |
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
AAMAS
2011
Springer
12 years 12 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
ATAL
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...