6 search results - page 1 / 2 » Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations |
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
We study implementability in dominant strategies of social choice functions when sets of types are multi-dimensional and convex, sets of outcomes are arbitrary, valuations for outc...
SIGECOM
2000
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2000
ACM
This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is receiv...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders’ information. W...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
2004
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...