67 search results - page 1 / 14 » Characterizing Truthful Market Design |
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
12 years 7 months ago
2011
ACM
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
ESA
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...