13 search results - page 1 / 3 » Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinat... |
ATAL
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
WECWIS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2007
IEEE
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICA) have been getting increasing attention both from researchers and in practice as they can increase efficiency of complex markets with substi...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 5 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
2004
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...