13 search results - page 2 / 3 » Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinat... |
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2007
Springer
Distributed allocation and multiagent coordination problems can be solved through combinatorial auctions. However, most of the existing winner determination algorithms for combina...
EOR
2011
12 years 9 months ago
2011
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 11 days ago
2009
Springer
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...