13 search results - page 3 / 3 » Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games |
ATAL
2009
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2009
Springer
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency ...
SAGT
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
SAGT
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...