Sciweavers

Share
14 search results - page 3 / 3
» Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Sort
View
ATAL
2009
Springer
9 years 6 months ago
The price of democracy in coalition formation
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency ...
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukar...
SAGT
2010
Springer
202views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
8 years 10 months ago
Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani
SAGT
2010
Springer
191views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
8 years 10 months ago
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind
WALCOM
2016
IEEE
68views Algorithms» more  WALCOM 2016»
3 years 7 months ago
Parameterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in the Obnoxious Facility Game
In the obnoxious facility game, a location for an undesirable facility is to be determined based on the voting of selfish agents. Design of group strategy proof mechanisms has be...
Morito Oomine, Aleksandar Shurbevski, Hiroshi Naga...
books