We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
In this paper we eliminate the need for parameter estimation associated with the set covering machine (SCM) by directly minimizing generalization error bounds. Firstly, we consider...