This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is receiv...
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
We discuss the design of multi-dimensional tender and auction mechanisms that combine Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanisms select an agent to perform...