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JAIR
2011
214views more  JAIR 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness
There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game mo...
Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintve...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
165views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in general normal-form or Bayesian games is a topic that has recently been gaining attention, in part due to the application of such algo...
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 4 months ago
Quality-bounded solutions for finite Bayesian Stackelberg games: scaling up
The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for o...
Manish Jain, Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
142views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
13 years 10 months ago
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realis...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm