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» Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates
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CORR
2002
Springer
125views Education» more  CORR 2002»
8 years 9 months ago
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2012
Springer
249views Education» more  CORR 2012»
7 years 5 months ago
Controlling Candidate-Sequential Elections
All previous work on “candidate-control” manipulation of elections has been in the model of full-information, simultaneous voting. This is a problem, since in quite a few real...
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jör...
CATS
2007
8 years 10 months ago
On The Complexity of Manipulating Elections
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...
Tom Coleman, Vanessa Teague
ATAL
2010
Springer
8 years 10 months ago
Manipulation of copeland elections
We resolve an open problem regarding the complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation, namely, the complexity of Copeland -manipulation for {0, 1}. Copeland , 0 1, is an...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
ATAL
2015
Springer
3 years 5 months ago
Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability
We study multiple referenda and committee elections, when the ballot of each voter is simply a set of approved binary issues (or candidates). Two well-known rules under this model...
Georgios Amanatidis, Nathanaël Barrot, J&eacu...
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