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» Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates
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AAAI
2010
13 years 2 months ago
Cloning in Elections
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that...
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Copeland voting: ties matter
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter that describes how ties in head-to-head contests...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
AAAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh
CORR
2006
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 4 months ago
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh