12597 search results - page 1 / 2520 » Complexity of Mechanism Design |
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de...
Lecture Notes
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
The focus of this chapter is on the Gen...
JCSS
2008
13 years 4 months ago
2008
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...