We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to “compact” representati...
Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin L...
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing o...
We analyze the complexity of equilibria problems for a class of strategic zero-sum games, called Angel-Daemon games. Those games were introduced to asses the goodness of a web or g...
Strategic games may exhibit symmetries in a variety of ways. A characteristic feature, enabling the compact representation of games even when the number of players is unbounded, i...
We study Congestion Games with non-increasing cost functions (Cost Sharing Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has been an open que...