Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Dorota Marciniak...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a c...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Dorota Marciniak, Marcin Szamo...
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...
There are relatively few proposals for inconsistency measures for propositional belief bases. However inconsistency measures are potentially as important as information measures f...