Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are playing an ever increasing role in the study of systems of autonomous computational agents. A common criticism of N...
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul...
Abstract. We continue the recently initiated study of the computational aspects of weak saddles, an ordinal set-valued solution concept proposed by Shapley. Brandt et al. gave a po...
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan ...
Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Dorota Marciniak...
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a c...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Dorota Marciniak, Marcin Szamo...