468 search results - page 1 / 94 » Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General... |
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2003
ACM
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2003
ACM
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...