We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...
d abstract) Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov The University of Texas at Austin We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protoco...
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated too...
In wireless ad hoc networks environment, Bellovin and Merritt first developed a password-based Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol against offline dictionary attacks using both ...
In this paper we identify the (P, Q)-DDH assumption, as an extreme, powerful generalization of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption: virtually all previously proposed gen...