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» Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey
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ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Commitment and extortion
Making commitments, e.g., through promises and threats, enables a player to exploit the strengths of his own strategic position as well as the weaknesses of that of his opponents....
Paul Harrenstein, Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
On the limits of dictatorial classification
In the strategyproof classification setting, a set of labeled examples is partitioned among multiple agents. Given the reported labels, an optimal classification mechanism returns...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
MOBIHOC
2007
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
Distributed opportunistic scheduling for ad-hoc communications: an optimal stopping approach
We consider distributed opportunistic scheduling (DOS) in wireless ad-hoc networks, where many links contend for the same channel using random access. In such networks, distribute...
Dong Zheng, Weiyan Ge, Junshan Zhang
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 8 months ago
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme ...