Abstract. We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sha...
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...
We consider a game-theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem in which each player j, out of a set of k players, strives to connect his terminal pair (sj, tj) of vertices in...
We provide a new technique to derive group strategyproof mechanisms for the cost-sharing problem. Our technique is simpler and provably more powerful than the existing one based on...
Abstract. We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof costsharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides a set of player...