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» Course Allocation by Proxy Auction
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WINE
2010
Springer
145views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
Course Allocation by Proxy Auction
We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students' reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading m...
Scott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan Ullman
WECWIS
2005
IEEE
153views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2005»
13 years 11 months ago
A Framework for Computing the Outcome of Proxied Combinatorial Auctions
Proxy bidding has been proposed for combinatorial auctions as a means to speed up the auctions, to simplify the user interface, and to limit strategic behavior. The only previousl...
Jie Zhong, Peter R. Wurman
AAAI
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish