Abstract. We study secure information flow in a stack based Typed Assembly Language (TAL). We define a TAL with an execution stack and establish the soundness of its type system ...
Eduardo Bonelli, Adriana B. Compagnoni, Ricardo Me...
Non-interference is a high-level security property that guarantees the absence of illicit information leakages through executing programs. More precisely, non-interference for a p...
Abstract. Interactive programs allow users to engage in input and output throughout execution. The ubiquity of such programs motivates the development of models for reasoning about...
Kevin R. O'Neill, Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Cho...
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees protocol. More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active att...
Previously, we developed a type system to ensure secure information flow in a sequential, imperative programming language [VSI96]. Program variables are classified as either hig...