We develop a normative theory of interaction-negotiation in particular--among self-interested computationally limited agents where computational actions are game-theoretically tre...
Abstract- The main purpose of this work is to measure the effect of bargaining players’ information completeness on agreements in evolutionary environments. We apply Co-evolution...
In this paper we study multi issue alternating-offers bargaining in a perfect information finite horizon setting, we determine the pertinent subgame perfect equilibrium, and we pro...
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna
Auctions are useful mechanisms for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders know their own valua...