131 search results - page 1 / 27 » Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...
IVA
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. This paper details a framework for explicit deliberative control of socially and physically situated agents in virtual, real and mixed reality environments. The objective...
ATAL
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
KSEM
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. In this paper we propose a model that allows agents to deliberate using defeasible argumentation, to share knowledge with other agents, and to represent individual knowle...