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» Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents
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ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Parameterizing the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions have been studied by the multiagent systems community for some time, since these auctions are an effective mechanism for resource allocation when agents are...
David Loker, Kate Larson
AGENTS
2001
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Building agents for service provisioning out of components
The CASA architecture describes a platform for the provisioning of services by agents by supporting three levels of agent design. At the base level is a framework to build an agen...
Ralf Sesseler
AAMAS
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these ent...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurn...
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
Kate Larson