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» Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms
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INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
FOCS
2007
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar
DEXAW
2002
IEEE
80views Database» more  DEXAW 2002»
14 years 2 months ago
Private Auctions with Multiple Rounds and Multiple Items
For selling spectrum licenses economists have designed new auction types proceeding over several rounds and offering several licenses simultaneously. Communication between bidders...
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Matthias Schunter, Sandra Stei...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
FC
2003
Springer
133views Cryptology» more  FC 2003»
14 years 2 months ago
Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interest of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a com...
Koutarou Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo