11 search results - page 1 / 3 » Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auc... |
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
AAAI
2004
13 years 5 months ago
2004
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...