11 search results - page 2 / 3 » Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auc... |
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2008
Springer
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allo...
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
AIR
2004
13 years 4 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...